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The famous pilgrim and translator Xuanzang’s (玄奘, 602-664) transla-
tion of Śaṅkarasvāmin’s Introduction to Logic (Nyāyapraveśa, Yinming ru 
zhengli lun 因明入正理論) around 647 marks the beginning of the sys-
tematic study of Indian Buddhist logic or the “science of reasons” (hetu-
vidyā, yinming 因明) by Buddhist monks in China. This terse treatise 
deals with methods of defending and refuting disputed theses by adduc-
ing sound arguments. Although it addresses examples of correct and fal-
lacious inferences, its subject matter would be better described as rules 
of rational debate between representatives of competing philosophical 
schools, rather than formal logic.1 This pragmatic concern is readily ap-
parent in the section of the treatise that lists nine examples of “pseu-
do-‌theses” (pakṣa-ābhāsa, sizong 似宗), i.e. theses which are unaccep-
table as topics of debate. Śaṅkarasvāmin labels as “pseudo-theses” vari-
ous kinds of statement which the opponent might refuse to discuss, e.g. 
theses incompatible with experience or common sense, or those that 
contain concepts and terms whose meanings cannot be agreed upon by 
both sides. A thesis inconsistent with the philosophical views of the 
school to which the disputant belongs is also dismissed as invalid. It is 
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 According to I. M. Bocheński, Dignāga’s system of the “science of reasons”, presented in 
the Nyāyapraveśa, was one of the final stages in the transition from the “methodology of 
discussion” to formal logic in India (Bocheński, 1970: 431).  
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within such a context that the following sentence appears, without any 
further explanation: 
Sentence [1]  
自語相違者，如言: 「我母是其石女」 (T32:1630.11c2-3). 
svavacana-viruddho yathā: mātā me vandhyā iti (Guo, 1999: 43). 
[The fallacy of] “inconsistency with one’s own words” occurs in state-
ments such as this: “My mother is that barren woman.”2 
Around 655, Xuanzang decided to translate a more substantial Indian 
logical work by Dignāga, called The Gate of Logic (Nyāyamukha, Yinming 
zhengli men lun 因明正理門論). This treatise provides a different, shor-
ter list of “pseudo-theses”, consisting of only five categories. Although 
the sentence above is not among them, Dignāga quotes another example 
of a thesis that is internally inconsistent:  
Sentence [2]  
若相[?]3違義言聲所遣，如立: 「一切言皆是妄」(T32:1628.‌1a19-20). 
*yadi viruddhārthavācinā svavacanena bādhyate yathā: sarvam uktaṃ mṛ-
ṣêti.4 
(A thesis is invalid) if one’s own words and meaning exclude each oth-
er, for example, when someone claims: “All statements are false.”5  
-------------------------------------------------- 
2 It is clear from the context that the term “barren woman” (“stone woman” in Chinese) 
denotes a woman that has never been capable of giving birth. 
3 This reading follows the amendment proposed by Katsura Shōryū (桂紹隆) on the basis 
of the corresponding Skt. fragments. Traditional Chinese editions of the text have the 
character (fei 非). A third variant reading (ti 體) was proposed by the Japanese com-
mentator Usui Hōun (烏水宝雲, 1791-1847) (Katsura, 1977: 113). 
4 The Skt. manuscript of the Nyāyamukha preserved in Tibet (Luo, 1985: 69-70) had not 
been published at the time of writing of this paper. The corresponding Skt. fragment is 
reconstructed by Katsura Shōryū from the quotation in Prajñākaragupta’s Prāmaṇavārt-
tika-bhāṣya (Katsura, 1977: 113).  
5 The translation of the Chinese sentence is simplified due to textual problems. Classical 
Chinese vocabulary has no clear distinction between “sentence” and “statement”. How-
ever, at least some Chinese commentators on this passage clearly understand the word 
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It seems that all Chinese (and in fact all East Asian) commentators of 
Indian treatises on Buddhist logic regarded Sentences [1] and [2] as two 
samples of one and the same fallacy, labeled according to the text of the 
Introduction to Logic as “inconsistency with one’s own words” (zi yu xiang-
wei 自語相違, after Sanskrit svavacanaviruddha).6 Even though it is not 
entirely clear to what extent this classification reflected the previous 
views of Indian Buddhist logicians,7 it is fairly understandable in the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
yan (言) as referring to yanlun (言論) “discourses”, i.e. sentences that express some 
claims.  
6 It is difficult if not impossible to find a term from contemporary logic that could be 
applied to both examples. The term “self-refutation” is probably the most appropriate 
choice, partly due to the fact that it has no universally accepted definition. The broad-
est definitions of this term largely match the meaning intended by the Buddhist au-
thors discussed in this article. For example, Simon Blackburn defines the term as fol-
lows: “A self-refuting utterance is one which is shown to be false in the very fact of its 
being made” (Blackburn, 1996: 345). In modern Western philosophical literature, self-
refuting statements have been defined by some authors (Passmore, 1970: 59, 80; Perrett, 
1984: 237, 239) as statements which are self-contradictory in themselves, rather than 
inconsistent with some remote implications or other statements uttered by the same 
person. This is analogous to the rationale behind distinguishing the fallacy of “inconsis-
tency with one’s own words” from “inconsistency with one’s own teachings” (āgama-
viruddha, zijiao xiangwei 自教相違) in Buddhist logic. Contemporary discussions of self-
refutation also include so-called “pragmatic self-refutation”, exemplified by such state-
ments as “I cannot speak” (Mackie, 1964; Passmore, 1970: 62). As is shown below, pre-
cisely this kind of statement was counted by East Asian commentators as one of the 
subtypes of the fallacy in question. However, it should be noted that on some defini-
tions, statements such as Sentence [1] are classified as self-contradictory but not self-
refuting (Castagnoli, 2010: 5-6; Chmielewski, 1981: 67, 70). Even though self-refutation is 
sometimes considered to be a sub-category of self-contradiction, as a translation of 
technical expression used in Chinese Buddhist logic, the term “self-contradiction” 
could be misleading. It might be argued that the system of Buddhist logic does not seem 
to have a clear counterpart of the Western notion of contradiction, understood as a 
relation between two statements (Chmielewski, 1981: 71). The term viruddha, translated 
by Xuanzang as xiangwei, has broader application, as it refers to a relation between the 
thesis and any kind of counter-evidence that renders it problematic, including the testi-
mony of perception. Moreover, neither sentence directly exhibits “contradiction” in the 
most common current meaning of this term, i.e. a conjunction of two opposing state-
ments (p and not-p), and Buddhist logicians generally did not try to resolve both of 
them into this self-contradictory form.  
7 An anonymous Indian treatise translated into Chinese around 550 as The Treatise on Ac-
cordance with Truth (Rushi lun 如實論 *Tarka-śāstra), in a passage that appears to be an 
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context of the principles of the “science of reasons”. Both Sentences [1] 
and [2], unlike other types of “pseudo-theses”, exemplify statements 
which are internally flawed, i.e. untenable on logical grounds alone. Any-
one who proposes a thesis of either kind at the same time inadvertently 
proposes its refutation. For this reason such theses are unacceptable 
regardless of the philosophical affiliation of the disputant and opponent.  
That being said, the issues represented by Sentences [1] and [2] have 
generally been distinguished in the history of logic in the West. “My 
mother is a barren woman” – hereafter referred to simply as Sentence [1] 
– is a case of what in traditional Western logic would be classified as con-
tradictio in terminis or contradictio in adiecto, a statement whose predicate 
is in conflict with its subject. This kind of fallacy was discussed in detail 
by medieval scholastics (Rieger, 2005: 74-76). “All statements are false” – 
hereafter referred to as Sentence [2] – is a canonical example of a state-
ment that is both self-referential and self-refuting. Although it never 
gained the notoriety of the much knottier “Liar’s Paradox” (“This state-
ment is false”), its variants have often appeared in Western logical litera-
ture of the ancient, medieval and modern periods (Chmielewski, 1981; 
Castagnoli, 2007).8  
Both of the aforementioned Indian treatises were studied by the 
disciples of Xuanzang, who attempted to write their own commentaries 
-------------------------------------------------- 
early version of the list of “pseudo-theses”, mentions the sentence “A virgin has a child” 
(童女有兒 *kumārī putravatī) as an example of a thesis that is fallacious due to internal 
inconsistency. In a different passage, it demonstrates how to refute someone who 
claims, “I reject all that is said” (一切所說我皆不許 *sarvam uktaṃ na anujñāye??). 
Zheng Weihong (2007: 79) follows the Chinese tradition in identifying the second state-
ment as another example of the previously mentioned fallacy, but the text does not 
seem to state that explicitly (cf. T32:1633.29a18-21, 30b17-23; and Tucci, 1981: 4, 11 [Skt. 
pagination], 2, 3 [Arabic pagination]).  
8 According to Chmielewski, at least from the time of Aristotle, the customary approach 
of Western logicians was to regard such statements as implying their own falsehood, 
and ergo false. In the early twentieth century, Bertrand Russell (Russell, 1963: 40-42) 
challenged this view by arguing that [2], being a proposition about all propositions, is a 
meaningless statement, and as such cannot be legitimately asserted to be either true or 
false. Castagnoli argues that ancient self-refutation arguments generally did not aim at 
establishing the necessary falsehood of such statements as [2], but rather, at “criticizing 
such theses as dialectical losers” (Castagnoli, 2007: 68).  
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in order to clarify the meaning of these notoriously difficult texts. 
Needless to say, Chinese monks had no training in formal logic whatso-
ever. Their most reliable clues as to the interpretation of Sentences [1] 
and [2] was a rather random selection of Chinese translations of Indian 
works dealing with the art of argumentation, and possibly some pieces of 
oral commentary transmitted by their master Xuanzang, who had re-
portedly studied the “science of reasons” in India. Although ancient 
Chinese thinkers occasionally took issue with self-contradictory and 
self-refuting statements (Chmielewski, 2009: 269-296; Graham, 1978: 445, 
453; Harbsmeier, 1998: 212-218; Sun, 1999: 51-53, 258-259), there is no 
trace of this indigenous legacy in the writings of Xuanzang’s disciples.  
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the interpretations of Sen-
tences [1] and [2] provided by the Chinese commentators to see how 
they approached the logical problems involved in these sentences. The 
focus will be placed on commentaries from the early Tang period, writ-
ten by three direct disciples of Xuanzang: Wengui (文軌, d.u.), Shentai 
(神泰, d.u.) and Kuiji (窺基, 632-682), since their works contain the most 
original and insightful treatment of this problem in the whole history of 
Buddhist logic in East Asia. Even though the fragments discussed below 
certainly belong to the history of logic as such, it is to be remembered 
that their authors did not conceive of themselves as “logicians” in the 
contemporary sense of the word. They perceived the fallacy of “incon-
sistency with one’s own words” primarily as a rhetorical tool that could 
be used to denounce heterodox views. Therefore, the final section of this 
paper will examine cases of the practical application of this notion in the 
context of doctrinal polemics typical of seventh-century East Asia. 
Secondary scholarship on this subject is scarce. Sueki Takehiro (末木
剛博, 2001: 71-73) briefly mentioned Sentence [2] in his book devoted to 
the history of rationalism in Asia, and offered an interpretation of it in 
modern symbolic notation. Janusz Chmielewski (Chmielewski, 1981: 60-
72) scrutinized relevant passage from Kuiji’s commentary in a volumi-
nous article about historical approaches to Russell’s “principle of reductio 
ad absurdum”, thus placing Kuiji’s work in a very broad comparative per-
spective. Unfortunately, Chmielewski’s paper, which was published only 
in Polish, is virtually unknown to specialists in related fields. The same 
passage was discussed by several contemporary Chinese scholars of 
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Buddhist logic, most notably Chen Daqi (陳大齊, 1974: 118-122) and Shen 
Jianying (沈劍英, 1985: 180-182), and more recently by Zheng Weihong 
(鄭偉宏, 1997: 368-371; 1999: 9-12; 2010: 353-356), who aligned it with the 
corresponding fragment of Shentai’s work.9 Generally speaking, the re-
marks of Chinese authors are not as extensive as Chmielewski’s, and less 
informative in terms of the comparative history of logic.  
The interpretation of Wengui 
One of the earliest extant Chinese commentaries on Śaṅkarasvāmin’s 
Introduction to Logic is the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu (因明入正理論疏) by 
Wengui, a disciple of Xuanzang. Wengui’s grasp of the Indian “science of 
reasons” is known to be remarkable (Shen, 2007; Takemura, 1968; 1986: 
32-34, 217-246). Even though his treatment of these problematic state-
ments appears to be significant in historical and comparative terms, it is 
relatively little known among contemporary scholars. For this reason it 





[The error of] “inconsistency with one’s own words” – as in My mother 
is that barren woman.  
Says the commentary: [In the sentence above] “my mother” is the 
dharmin (youfa 有法) and “barren woman” is the dharma (fa 法). 
When dharmin and dharma are in agreement with each other, there is 
[a valid] thesis. [Here,] however, what is said to be the dharmin 
opposes its dharma and what is said to be the dharma counters its 
dharmin. If one says: “my mother”, it is understood that she is not an 
infertile woman; by saying: “barren woman”, it is made clear that [the 
woman in question] is not my mother. In such a case, there is a mutu-
-------------------------------------------------- 
9 The last work also contains a very brief mention of the passage from Zhizhou’s com-
mentary, which is discussed in the last section of this article.  
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al conflict [between dharmin and dharma]. This is what is meant by 
“inconsistency with one’s own words”.  
[3b] 如外道立言: 「一切言論」是有法，「皆是妄語」是法。此立
宗之言意許非妄有法中攝。 若言: 「一切言論」，即意許一分非妄，
何得云: 「皆是妄語」? 若云: 「皆是妄語」，何得言「一切言論」? 
以「一切」之言攝此宗意許非妄故。 
[Furthermore, some] non-Buddhists make a claim [in which] “all 
statements” is the dharmin, and “are all false talk” is the dharma. [But] 
if someone sets forth such a thesis, [then] what is intended by his 
words, [i.e.] the non-falsity [of his own thesis], is [also] included in the 
dharmin. If someone says [something about] “all statements”, then 
that person [already] implicitly acknowledges [that] some [statements] 
(i.e. at least his own statement) are not false; how can he [further] 
maintain that they “are all false talk”? If someone says “are all false 
talk”, how can he make [this] statement about “all claims”? [This is 
inadmissible,] because the word “all” (in “all claims”) includes the in-
tended non-falsity of his own thesis. 
[3c] 若救言: 「除我言外，餘一切言皆悉是妄者」，更有一人聞汝所
說，便言: 「汝語非妄，諦實」。彼所發言，為妄為實? 若言: 「是
妄語」，則汝語虗。若言: 「是實」，即違自語。 
Suppose you try to defend [the above claim] by stating [it thus]: “A-
part from my own statement, all other statements are false.” Then an-
other man, after hearing your words, states that it is indeed as you 
say. Is his utterance false or true? If you reply that it is false, then it 
follows that your own words are false [lit. in vain]. If you reply that it 




   [宗]: 餘一切言不必是妄  
   [因]: 是語性故  
   [喻]: 如汝所言。 
158 Zamorski  
 
Suppose you still try to defend [the above claim] by stating [it thus]: 
“Apart from my own statement, and the statements of those who say 
that what I say is true, all other statements are false.” Such a thesis 
would [be unacceptable because it is] opposed by inference, namely:  
   Thesis [zong 宗]: All other statements are not necessarily false.  
   Reason [yin 因]: Because of their having the nature of speech.  
   Example [yu 喻]: Like what you yourself say (X53:848.690b7-19). 
In the first paragraph, Wengui introduces a pair of key concepts in the 
Indian “science of reasons” – dharma and dharmin (literally “that which 
has the dharma” or “dharma-possessor”). There is no consensus among 
contemporary scholars as to exactly how Indian authors understood this 
opposition. English translations from Sanskrit include: “subject” and 
“predicate” (Tucci, 1930), “property-bearer” and “property” (Tachikawa, 
1971), “substrate” and “superstrate” (Gillon & Love, 1980), “locus” and 
“locatee” (Matilal, 1998) etc. How Chinese commentators on Indian trea-
tises understood these terms is of course yet another issue.  
Wengui himself in his commentary discusses three possible inter-
pretations of dharma and dharmin, but seems most committed to the one 
that defines dharma as “that which specifies” (nengbie 能別), and dhar-
min as “that which is specified” (suobie 所別) (X53:848.682a4 ff.).10 He 
explains their mutual relation by the analogy of wax and seal.11 When 
we attribute a certain dharma to a certain dharmin, the latter becomes 
“specified” or “differentiated” (chabie 差別), i.e. characterized by a 
particular quality that distinguishes it from other dharmins, just as a 
round seal distinguishes a piece of wax to which it was applied from a 
piece of wax in which a square seal was stamped. According to the prin-
ciples of Buddhist logic, it is the presence of this distinguishing quality 
(dharma) in a given locus (dharmin) that is to be proved by disputants 
engaged in a debate. For example, an argument for the case that “sound 
is impermanent” has to convince one’s opponent that the dharma of 
“impermanence” inheres in the dharmin identified as “sound”. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
10 Other interpretations mentioned by Wengui are “difference” (chabie 差別) vs. “es-
sence” (zixing 自性) and “comment” (houshu 後述) vs. “topic” (xianchen 先陳).  
11 It appears that the character 臘 in the text of the Xuzangjing should be emended to 
蠟.  
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What Wengui seems to understand by “inconsistency with one’s own 
words”, in the case of Sentence [1], is that a statement which attributes 
the dharma of “being infertile” to the dharmin described as “my mother” 
cannot become the subject of any meaningful debate, since it is known a 
priori that no “mother” can be a possible locus for such a quality. This is 
because the very term “mother” denotes someone who is not a barren 
woman, and the very term “barren woman” denotes someone who is not 
a mother. Whereas the disputant’s objective is to prove the connection 
between dharmin and dharma, in the case of Sentence [1], the possibility 
of such a connection is implicitly refuted. It can be inferred that such a 
fallacy occurs whenever the subject and predicate of a thesis are 
mutually contrary or contradictory terms.12  
Wengui’s explanation of the fallacy inherent in Sentence [1] resem-
bles the refutation of a similar statement, “A virgin has a child,” in the 
Chinese translation of an early Indian work on Buddhist logic known as 
The Treatise on Accordance with Truth (Rushi lun 如實論, *Tarka-śāstra), 
traditionally ascribed to the half-legendary sage Vasubandhu: 
[4] 若是童女，不得有兒。若有兒，則非童女。「童女」、「有兒」， 此
二相違。 是故，稱有言說無道理。 
If she is a virgin, she cannot have a child. If she has a child then she is 
not a virgin. “Being a virgin” and “having a child” are two mutually 
opposed [qualities]. Thus it is said that this kind of discourse is illo-
gical (T32:1633.29a18-21).13 
From the comparative point of view, it should be noted that unlike the 
Indian author, Wengui clearly emphasizes the mutual semantic incon-
gruence between the words or terms (yan 言) that constitute the two 
parts of the thesis. He does not elaborate any ontological reasons for 
which the quality of being a “barren woman” cannot be predicated of 
-------------------------------------------------- 
12 It can be argued that Wengui was (at least vaguely) aware of the difference between 
contrary and contradictory terms, as he wrote: “‘Permanence’ and ‘impermanence’ 
are directly (truly) opposed” (「常」與「無常」正相違) (X53:848.685b1). 
13 T32:1633.29a18-20. Skt. retranslation by Tucci is as follows: (…) yato yadi kumārī putra-
vatīti na sampadyate. yadi putravatī tarhi naiva kumārī. kumārīti putravatīti cobhayaṃ virud-
dham. tasmān mama vacanam anyāyyam iti (Tucci, 1981: 4 [Skt. pagination]).  
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anyone’s mother. Moreover, from the structure of his argument in Pas-
sage [3a], it is clear that he focuses on the symmetrical relation between 
the two terms, rather than on the relation between subject and predi-
cate.14  
Wengui’s analysis of Sentence [2] in Passage [3b] is clearly meant to 
follow the same scheme of explanation as his interpretation of Sentence 
[1] in Passage [3a]. Namely, he suggests that the dharmin “all statements” 
is incompatible with the dharma “are [all] false” and vice versa. In spite of 
this misguided premise, Wengui manages to pinpoint some essential 
differences between the two statements. He seems to be aware that the 
problem with Sentence [2] lies not in the mutually exclusive semantic 
fields of the terms in question (there is nothing outright contradictory in 
predicating falsehood of a statement), but in the use of the universal 
quantifier “all”, which renders the whole statement self-referential and 
eventually self-refuting. Moreover, Wengui seems to believe that some-
one who states that “all statements are false” at the same time makes the 
tacit assumption that his own statement is true. It is the opposition be-
tween this assumption (the “intended meaning” yixu 意許) and the 
statement itself (“what is said” yan 言), rather than the opposition be-
tween the subject and predicate of the statement, that Wengui turns to 
in his analysis.15  
-------------------------------------------------- 
14 The extent of difference between Wengui’s understanding of contradictio in terminis 
and that of Western traditional logic merits further investigation. According to the 
thirteenth-century classification proposed by Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus), state-
ments such as Sentence [1] are considered as propositions in materia remota, i.e. propo-
sitions whose predicates and subjects can never agree with each other. His contempo-
rary, Lambert of Auxerre, argued that in propositions of this kind, the predicate “natu-
rally disagrees” with its subject (predicatum naturaliter disconvenit subiecto) (Alessio, 
1971: 19; Rieger, 2005: 74-75). An early twentieth-century German philosophical dic-
tionary (Eisler, 1927) defines contradictio in adiecto as a “proposition in which the pre-
dicate term cancels the subject term” (Urteil, in welchem der Prädikatsbegriff den Subjekts-
begriff aufhebt). Interestingly, in another fragment of his commentary, Wengui goes a-
gainst Indian sources (and the Aristotelian approach) by saying that in some sense, the 
dharmin also “specifies” its dharma (X53:848.683a1-3; Harbsmeier, 1998: 369 n. 1). 
15 The distinction between the explicit content of what is said in a thesis (“that which is 
expressed by words” yanchen 言陳 or yanxian 言顯) and its intended meaning (“that 
which is implicitly accepted” yixu 意許) is an important one in the system of the “sci-
ence of reasons”. How Chinese authors understood this distinction, and the extent to 
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Wengui’s main argument - that someone who denies the truth of all 
statements at the same time asserts the truth of his own statement and 
thus contradicts himself - has respectable parallels in the history of 
Western logic.16 Interestingly, it appears that Indian Buddhist debaters 
started to apply the germinal form of this argument very early. Wengui 
might have taken this idea either directly from Dignāga’s description of 
the fallacy represented by Sentence [2] in the Gate of Logic, or from his 
master Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of The Gem in the Palm of the Hand 
(Zhang zhen lun 掌珍論, *Karatalaratna-śāstra) by the sixth-century philo-
sopher Bhāviveka: 




which they followed Indian discussions on this subject, is a topic that requires a sepa-
rate study. Wengui comes closest to defining this pair of concepts in a fragment of his 
commentary which is preserved as a quote in the Japanese monk Zōshun’s (藏俊, 
1104-1180) Inmyō daisho shō (因明大疏抄). His explanation suggests that the main pur-
pose of this distinction is to separate the literal or general meanings of terms that con-
stitute a thesis (their “substance” zixiang 自相) from the specific meanings of those 
terms, which reflect the debater’s hidden philosophical assumptions (their “specifici-
ties” chabie 差別). For example, when a Mahāyāna Buddhist utters the word “imper-
manence”, his intended meaning may be “impermanence [of something] which is only 
a manifestation of Consciousness” (T68:2271.713b23-c5). However, Wengui’s use of 
these concepts appears to be somewhat broader than his definition would suggest. In 
the surviving portion of his commentary he invokes the notion of “intended meaning” 
to explain how a Buddhist who argues that “sound is impermanent” at the same time 
establishes that sound is devoid of permanent self (wuwo 無我): since everything that 
is impermanent is also devoid of permanent self, the latter quality “follows” (shun 順) 
from the former without being explicitly mentioned (X53:848.686a16-21). Seen in this 
light, [2] represents a case in which a speaker’s intended meaning – the non-falsity of 
his own statement – cannot be consistently attributed to either part of the explicitly 
stated thesis. 
16 Somewhat similar (although more theoretically sophisticated) refutations of sentences 
equivalent to Sentence [2] were discussed by Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210) and 
Bonaventure (1221-1274) (Castagnoli, 2010: 132-135). This type of argument was fur-
ther refined by Thomas Bradwardine (ca. 1290-1349) and, more famously, John Buri-
dan (ca. 1300-1362) (Hughes, 1982: 45-51, 100-112; Prior, 1976; Read, 2002; Spade, 1982: 
249).  
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A [non-Buddhist] brahmacārin said [to the Buddha]: “World-Honored 
One, I do not assert anything.” The Buddha replied: “Brahmacārin, do 
you assert this thing [you said] or not?” The brahmacārin firmly as-
serted the thing [he said], but [still] maintained that he did not assert 
anything. His words were in opposition with a thing he assumed [彼
言違自所許事]. This is what is called the fallacy of violating one’s 
own statement (T30:1578.27b10-12).17  
In Passage [3c], Wengui discusses the possibility of defending the “non-
Buddhist’s” claim by explicitly excluding the statement “All statements 
are false” from the set of “all statements”, in order to avoid self-refe-
rence and the self-refutation it entails. This idea might also have been 
inspired by an Indian antecedent, contained in The Treatise on Accordance 
with Truth: 





If you say that you reject all that is said, I will now settle this issue 
with you. You say that you reject “all”; is what you say counted 
among “all” or is it not? If it is counted among “all”, you yourself re-
ject what you say. If you yourself reject it, then what I propose is what 
you do not reject. What I propose is established by itself, and your 
words are thus refuted. If it is not counted among “all”, then there is 
no “all” [i.e. it is not “all” that you are making a statement about]. In 
such a case, you reject the “all” [in your own statement], and what I 
-------------------------------------------------- 
17 In the Buddhist literature the brahmacārin’s skeptical claim is usually ascribed to a re-
cluse called Dīrghanakha (Pali: Dīghanakha, Ch. Zhangzhao 長爪), the Buddha’s inter-
locutor in the Pāli Dīghanakha-sutta (Jayatilleke, 1963: 213-216), who is quite frequently 
mentioned in the Chinese Tripiṭaka (e.g. T2:99.249b1 ff.). A more verbose refutation of 
Dīrghanakha’s stance can be found in the preface to Jizang’s (吉藏, 549-‌623) commen-
tary on Āryadeva’s Śata-śāstra (Bai lun 百論) (T42:1827.235b6-15).  
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propose is not what you reject. What I propose is again established, 
and your words are finally refuted (T32:1633.30b17-23).18  
According to Janusz Chmielewski, this short fragment has ground-break-
ing significance in the history of logic. It suggests a way of avoiding self-‌
reference which was not endorsed by ancient Greek or Chinese authors, 
and in fact, may be regarded as the earliest known anticipation of Rus-
sell’s revolutionary approach (Chmielewski, 1981: 47-49, 86). The possibi-
lity of construing potentially self-referential statements as self-except-
ing, rather than literally universal, was discussed in the Western logical 
literature of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Ashworth, 1974: 104-‌
106; Spade, 1982: 248) and has been suggested by a contemporary author 
as one of the most viable approaches to the elimination of the paradoxes 
occasioned by self-reference (Rescher, 1968: 16). In this context, it is cer-
tainly worth noticing that Wengui not only appears familiar with this 
possibility, but also discusses it at considerable length within the con-
ceptual framework of the Buddhist “science of reasons”. 
In Passage [3c], the Chinese commentator argues that an improved 
version of Sentence [2]: “All statements are false, apart from this very 
statement,” is untenable, since every other statement that affirms the 
truth of the speaker’s sentence also cannot be false. For this reason, in 
Passage [3d], Wengui’s imaginary non-Buddhist opponent once more 
rephrases his claim. The proposition he is now trying to defend is: “All 
statements are false, apart from this very statement and those state-
ments that affirm the truth of this very statement.” Wengui argues that 
such a thesis is still unacceptable, even though it belongs to a different 
category of “pseudo-thesis”, namely “a thesis opposed by inference” 
(anumānaviruddha, biliang xiangwei 比量相違).  
-------------------------------------------------- 
18 The Skt. retranslation by Tucci: yac ca (bhavato)ktaṃ mayā sarvam uktaṃ nānujñāyata iti 
tad idānīṃ (bhavatā sārdhaṃ) vicārya nirdhāryate. sarvaṃ nānujñāyata iti yad uktam bhava-
tā, etad vacanaṃ sarvasminn antarbhavati na vā? yadi tāvat sarvasminn antarbhavati, tadā 
bhavān svayaṃ svoktaṃ nānujānāti. yadi svayaṃ nānujānāti, asmadarthaḥ svata eva siddho 
bhaved bhavavacanasya tu hāniḥ syāt. atha sarvasmin nāntarbhavati, tadā tasya sarvatvam 
eva na syāt. yadi sarvatvam eva na bhavet, tadā bhavatā yad ananujñātaṃ tat sarvam. yadi 
sarvam ananujñātaṃ, tadāsmadartho bhavatā naivānanujñātaḥ. asmadarthaḥ siddho, bhava-
tas tu sarvasya pratiṣedhaḥ (Tucci, 1981: 11 [Skt. pagination]). 
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The “inference” presented by Wengui follows the three-membered 
scheme expounded by Dignāga.19 The crux of this reasoning is that 
statements arbitrarily excluded from the set of “all statements” by the 
opponent share with the remaining elements of this set a property de-
scribed as “the nature of speech” (yuxing 語性). In the technical vocabu-
lary of Xuanzang’s disciples, this term apparently denotes the mean-
ingful use of language.20 By uttering his statement, the opponent de-
monstrates that meaningful sentences spoken by humans are not neces-
sarily false. It is therefore illogical for him to maintain that all other 
statements, which are also meaningful sentences, are necessarily false.  
It is not entirely clear, however, if Wengui’s conclusion, “All other 
statements are not necessarily false” (餘一切言不必是妄) should be in-
terpreted as a simple particular negative (“Some other statements are 
not false”) or a modal statement (“All other statements are possibly not 
false”). Dignāga’s “science of reasons”, the only system of rules of infer-
ence known to Wengui, has little to say regarding quantification of the-
ses, and has nothing commensurable with the modal syllogistic of tradi-
tional Western logic.  
The intepretation of Shentai  
Shentai’s (神泰) commentary to the Gate of Logic, Li men lun shuji (理門論
述記), contains an interesting explanation of Sentence [2] that does not 
make explicit reference to Sentence [1]: 
-------------------------------------------------- 
19 This sort of inference presupposes a relation of “invariable concomitance” between 
the two dharmas (qualities) possessed by the dharmin (locus of quality) in question. Just 
as the presence of fire on a mountain is inferred from the presence of smoke, since 
there cannot be smoke without fire, the presence of the quality described as “the 
nature of speech” serves an as infallible mark of the presence of the quality of “not 
necessarily [being] false” in every possible locus.  
20 Cf. Kuiji’s explanation in T43:1830.504a20: “Verbal discourse is ‘the nature of speech’. 
In general terms, the essential characteristic of ‘the nature of speech’ is verbal activity, 
which can be of three natures (i.e., good, bad and neutral)” (言說是語性。語性總言，
即通三性語業為體). 
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[7a] 謂有外道立: 「一切語皆悉不實」。此所發語便自[語]相[違]。
何故? 說: 「一切語是妄者」，汝口中語為實為妄? 若言是實，何因
言「一切皆是妄語」? 若自言是妄，即應一切語皆實。 
[The fallacy of “inconsistency with one’s own words”] refers to the 
claims of non-Buddhists that all statements are not true. Whoever ut-
ters such a statement opposes his own words. Why is that? [If] you say 
that all statements are false, then are the words you speak true or 
false? If they are true, what are your grounds for maintaining that all 
statements are false? If your own words are false, then all statements 




Suppose you try to defend your claim by stating [it thus]: “Apart from 
what I am saying now, all other statements are false”. If there is ano-
ther man who, having heard you saying that all statements are false, 
replies: “It is indeed as you say,” is his utterance true or false? If it is 
false, then your own words are false (lit. in vain). If it is true, how can 
you maintain that “Apart from what I am saying now [all other state-





Suppose you still try to defend your claim and state [it thus]: “What 
that man says about my words is true; apart from this, all other state-
ments are false.” [Now,] suppose you are confronted by a third man, 
who says that the second man’s statement [about your words] is true. 
Is the statement of the third man false or true? If you reply that it is 
false, then it must be false that the words of the two previous speak-
ers are true. If the statement of the third man is true, then why do 
you say that apart from your statement and the statement of the sec-
ond man, all [other statements] are false? (T44:1839.78c28-79a12). 
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What Shentai says in Passage [7a] can be paraphrased as follows: if Sen-
tence [2] is assumed to be true, it is untenable; if it is assumed to be false, 
it implies that all other propositions are true. The latter statement con-
tains a rather blatant logical error, since the negation of a universal af-
firmative (all S are P) results in a particular negative (some S are not P) 
and not a universal negative (all S are not P). However, it should be not-
ed that Shentai does not content himself with rejecting Sentence [2] as a 
statement that implies its own falsehood, and therefore is false. It looks 
as if he is trying to present this sentence as a sort of paradox that yields 
unacceptable conclusions, on the assumption that it is true and on the 
assumption that it is false. As stated earlier, this approach is rather u-
nique in the history of logic.  
Zheng Weihong (Zheng, 2007: 79) rightly points out that Shentai’s re-
futation of Sentence [2] appears to be indebted to the passage from the 
Treatise on Accordance With Truth quoted above as Passage [6]. Granted, 
the arguments employed in Passages [6] and [7a] are formally very simi-
lar: the skeptical opponent is confronted with two horns of a dilemma 
implied by his statement and forced to admit self-refutation.21 Never-
theless, the two authors use this form of argument in slightly different 
way. Whereas the reasoning presented in the Indian treatise is meant 
primarily to force the opponent to admit defeat,22 the explanations of 
Shentai, although not correct in terms of formal logic, are more focused 
on demonstrating the inherent fallacy of the proposition in question. 
In Passage [7b], Shentai tackles the issue raised by Wengui in Passage 
[3c]. He differs from his co-disciple in that he does not resort to infer-
ence as the ultimate refutation of “non-Buddhist” theses. Instead, he 
seems to suggest that exclusion of the problematic statement from the 
scope of “all” sentences eventually leads to infinite regress. Unlike Wen-
gui, Shentai does not consider the refutation of the claim, “All state-
ments are false, apart from this very statement and all those statements 
that assert this very statement.” It is not clear whether he is not aware of 
-------------------------------------------------- 
21 This form of argumentation was well known to Indian debaters, who called it the 
“double noose” (Skt. ubhayataḥpāśā) (Perrett, 1984: 251).  
22 According to Tucci (Tucci, 1981: 3) Passage [6] is an example of chala, i.e. openly so-
phistic refutation. 
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this possibility, or if he assumes that it would also be susceptible to infi-
nite regress.  
Shentai’s discussion of Sentence [2] demonstrates even more clearly 
than parallel passages in Wengui’s commentary that the opponent’s the-
ses are problematic not only because they involve self-reference but also 
due to the fact that they predicate truth (shi 實) and falsity (wang 妄) of 
other statements. While it is unlikely that the modern idea of relegating 
this category of statements to a higher level in a hierarchy of meta-‌lan-
guages could have emerged among Chinese monks studying the “science 
of reasons”, it is certainly regrettable that later East Asian commentators 
on the Introduction to Logic were not interested in investigating this as-
pect of Shentai’s argument any further. 
The interpretation of Kuiji 
Kuiji (窺基), the most renowned of Xuanzang’s disciples, was credited 
with compiling the standard early Tang commentary on Śaṅkarasvā-
min’s Introduction to Logic, which became known in East Asia as the “Great 
Commentary” or Da shu (大疏). The following fragment was therefore re-
garded by the majority of subsequent commentators as the most autho-






The commentary says: “A thesis depends on a dharmin and a dharma. A 
dharmin is its subject (lit. substance [ti 體]). A dharma is its predicate 
(lit. meaning [yi 義]). A predicate depends on a subject. They cannot 
be at variance with each other and they have to be mutually recon-
cileable. Now, when someone says “my mother”, it is clearly under-
stood that she has a child. When someone says “a barren woman”, it is 
clearly implied that she has no child. The subject “my mother” and 
the predicate “a barren woman”, the dharmin and the dharma, do not 
support each other in mutual accord. If one already contradicts him-
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self in his own words, what [thesis] could he establish for the oppo-
nent [to respond to]?23 It is for this reason that such a sentence is 
fallacious (…). 





It is said in The Gate of Logic (Nyāyamukha): When someone states: All 
statements are false. This refers to [those] non-Buddhists who claim 
that all statements are false. Dignāga refuted [such a view] in the fol-
lowing way: 
“If you say that every statement is false, then you utter [another] 
statement, [assuming] that it is in accord with the facts. [Your 
statement itself] not being false, [it turns out that] one part [of “all 
statements”] is true, [i.e. that some statements are after all not 
false]. That means that your statement is in opposition with the 
word “all” in the dharmin (subject) of your thesis [i.e. “all state-
ments”]. If your own statement is itself false, [then] the other 
statements are not false, and by saying that they are false, you 
mistake what is not false for false; your own statement is itself 
false and the statements of others are not false. This [in turn] is in 
opposition with the dharma (predicate) of your thesis: “are all 
false”. For this reason [such a fallacy] is called “inconsistency with 
one’s own words” (T44:1840.116b21-c4). 
Kuiji’s initial comments resemble those of Wengui in Passage [3a]. How-
ever, his interpretation of the mutual incongruence between dharmin 
and dharma is somewhat different. Rather than the co-existence of two 
contrary terms within a statement, it is the co-existence of two mutually 
exclusive attributes (“having a child”, you zi 有子, and “childlessness”, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
23 In his Polish translation of this fragment, Janusz Chmielewski renders duidi (對敵) as a 
noun referring to “opponent” (Skt. prativādin) (Chmielewski, 1981: 61). If his reading is 
correct, this fragment should be translated as “How can the opponent support his own 
thesis?”  
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wu er 無兒) in one subject (not mentioned explicitly) that renders such a 
thesis inadmissible. In this sense, Kuiji’s understanding of the fallacy un-
derlying Sentence [1] resembles the Aristotelian notion of contradiction 
(Höffe, 2005: 51) much more closely than Wengui’s. The last sentence of 
the paragraph is also worthy of attention, since it very directly states 
that the Chinese author rejects Sentence [1] mainly because of its lack of 
pragmatic value. An opponent cannot really take issue with a statement 
that is self-contradictory. Perhaps he would not even understand what 
the controversy is about in the first place. 
In the dense Passage [8b], Kuiji proceeds to analyze Sentence [2]. Just 
as in Wengui’s commentary, this sentence is mentioned and analyzed af-
ter Sentence [1], even though it does not belong to the treatise which is 
the object of the commentary. Moreover, Kuiji takes the notion that both 
statements represent one and the same kind of fallacy even more seri-
ously than his predecessor. He seems to believe that just as in the case of 
Sentence [1], the problem with Sentence [2] lies in the mutual disagree-
ment between dharmin and dharma, corresponding to subject and predi-
cate respectively. His argument can be paraphrased as follows: If Sen-
tence [2] is true, then it contradicts the dharmin “all sentences”, since it 
is no longer all sentences that are false. If Sentence [2] is false, then it 
contradicts the dharma “are [all] false”, since it is not the case that all 
statements are false. In either case, the whole thesis is inconsistent be-
cause of the conflict between itself and one of its two constituent parts.  
Curiously, Kuiji explicitly attributes this argument to the great Indian 
logician Dignāga. This attribution was challenged by Janusz Chmielewski, 
who pointed out that the piece of reasoning presented by Kuiji presup-
poses redundant quantification of the predicate in the Chinese sentence: 
“All statements are all false” (一切言皆是妄). According to Chmielewski, 
since this peculiar grammatical feature of literary Chinese is absent in 
Sanskrit, it is extremely unlikely that an argument of this form was real-
ly proposed by Dignāga, or for that matter, by any native user of an Indo-‌
European language (Chmielewski, 1981: 63-66).  
Even though Chmielewski’s remarks cast serious doubt on the Indian 
origin of the ideas expressed in Passage [8b], it might be argued that they 
are not decisive, as the argument in question still makes sense under the 
assumption that the phrase “dharma of your thesis” originally referred 
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only to the predicate “false” (Skt. *mṛṣā), to which the adverbial qua-
si-‌quantifier “all” (jie 皆) was added later in the Chinese text. Never-
theless, Chmielewski certainly does have a point that there is something 
distinctively Chinese about the rhetoric of the whole passage, especially 
about the parallel structure of its main argument. On the other hand, if 
we delete problematic references to “oppositions” with dharmin and 
dharma, what remains is essentially nothing other than a slightly extend-
ed and improved version of Shentai’s Passage [7a], supplied with an idea 
probably borrowed from Wengui’s Passage [3b]. It might be conjectured 
that this common pattern of refutation of Sentence [2] was transmitted 
by Xuanzang to his disciples as a part of an oral commentary he had 
learned in India, and as such, was associated with the name of Dignāga 
himself.24 
In the concluding paragraph of his commentary (not translated here) 
Kuiji remarks that the fallacy of “inconsistency with one’s own words” 
can also be attributed to a thesis that in any way contradicts the philo-
sophical stance of its proponent (zijiao 自教). This means that a materi-
alist who states to his Buddhist (i.e. idealist) opponent that “The four ele-
ments (earth, water, fire and wind) are unreal” and a non-Buddhist skep-
tic who claims that “All statements are false” can be regarded as guilty of 
the same kind of fallacy. They both destroy their credibility as represent-
atives of one of the sides in the debate, by proposing a statement that 
goes against the tenets of their side, the only difference being that the 
skeptic simultaneously undermines the opponent’s stance as well (即違
自語，又違他語) (cf. T44:1840.116c). Kuiji’s opinion was already chal-
lenged in the eighth century by the monk Dingbin (定賓, d.u.), who 
-------------------------------------------------- 
24 This hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that a similar pattern of refutation of a 
statement representing the fallacy in question, translated by Th. Stcherbatsky as 
“whatsoever I speak is wrong” (sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi), appears in the Nyāyabinduṭīkā 
by Dharmottara (seventh or eighth century), a post-Dignāgan Indian work on Buddhist 
logic. Dharmottara begins his argument by pointing out that “the speaker pronounces 
his proposition in order to convey that these words (at least) have a true meaning” 
(yo ’pi hi sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmīti vakti so ’py asya vākyasya satyārthatvam ādarśayann eva 
vākyam uccārayati) and then proceeds to spell out the consequences that follow on the 
assumption that the speaker’s words are either true or false (Stcherbatsky, 1918: 59-60; 
2004: 166). 
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underlined the necessity of distinguishing between “inconsistency with 
the tenets of one’s own school” (自教相違) and “inconsistency with 
one’s own words” proper, which occurs regardless of the speaker’s philo-
sophical assumptions (T68:2270.325a20; Chen, 1974: 119). 
Later Japanese and Chinese interpretations  
By the beginning of the eighth century, Xuanzang’s translations of the 
two Indian manuals, complete with a whole set of Chinese commentaries, 
were transmitted to Japan, which contributed to the development of an 
independent scholastic tradition. In the Japanese commentaries on logi-
cal works that were included in the modern edition of the Buddhist ca-
non, the Taishō Tripiṭaka, the fallacy of “inconsistency with one’s own 
words” is mentioned quite often. However, Japanese authors were defi-
nitely not interested in challenging existing interpretations. For the 
most part they merely repeated in their own words the arguments of 
their Chinese predecessors, especially Kuiji. Exceptions can be found in 
the Inmyō ron sho myōtō shō (因明論疏明燈抄) compiled by Zenju (善珠, 
723-797), a monk of the Hossō (法相) school, the Japanese counterpart of 
the so-called “Faxiang” (法相) school founded by Xuanzang. Zenju offers 
an explanation of the distinction between “total inconsistency with 
one’s own words” (全分自語相違 or 自語全相違) and “partial incon-
sistency with one’s own words” (一分自語相違 or 自語分相違), which 
was only hinted at in Kuiji’s commentary (T44:1840.116c17). The first 
type is represented by Sentence [1] and a new example, “I am currently 
dumb” (我今瘖瘂).25 The second type is illustrated by Sentence [2] and 
the non-Buddhist claim “I do not affirm anything” quoted from Passage 
[4] (T68:2270.324c). Apparently, the terms “total” and “partial” refer – in 
-------------------------------------------------- 
25 Interestingly, a very similar pair of sentences can be found in the tenth-century Indian 
logical treatise Ātmatattvaviveka by the Nyāya logician Udayana, where they are pre-
sented as illustrations of inconsistency with one’s own words (svavacanavyāghāta) and 
inconsistency with one’s own actions (svakriyavyāghāta), respectively (Perrett, 1984: 
239). This might suggest that Zenju was inspired by some unknown Indian source, 
although pure coincidence cannot be ruled out as well.  
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the manner of Kuiji – to the extent of consensus between debaters.26 In 
the first case, no agreement can be reached on the thesis, and thus the 
fallacy is “total”. In the second case, it might still be admitted by the op-
ponent that some statements are false, and this makes the fallacy “par-
tial”.  
After flourishing briefly in the seventh century, the study of Buddhist 
logic in China lost most of its original impetus. The scarce and repetitive 
scholarship of later periods produced hardly any original approaches to 
the subject of fallacious theses. During the brief period of revival of the 
“science of reasons” in the late sixteenth century the issue of “inconsis-
tency with one’s own words” resurfaced once again, albeit treated in a 
very cursory way. Ming dynasty Chinese students of Buddhist logic had 
no access to early Tang commentaries, some of which were preserved 
only in Japan. Their writings, amounting to a handful of commentaries 
on the Introduction to Logic, are generally criticized by contemporary 
scholars as rife with simplifications and misunderstandings (Franken-
hauser, 1996: 203-205; Zheng, 2007: 278-292). The following quote from 
the Yinming ru zhengli lun jie (因明入正理論解, written around 1590 by 
the monk Zhenjie 真界, d.u.) can be treated as representative of the ap-
proach of Ming authors: 
[9] 鞠我育我，方為我母。石女無能養育，實非我母。而言我母是
其石女。豈不與自語相違哉。 
It is only she who “nourished me and supported me” that can be 
called my mother.27 An infertile woman cannot bring up and rear 
children. It is [evidently] true that she is not my mother. Now, to say 
that my mother is that barren woman – is this not a case of “inconsis-
tency with one’s own words”? (X53:856.912a4-7).28 
-------------------------------------------------- 
26 For different analyses of the usage of the terms “partial” (yifen 一分) and “total” 
(quanfen 全分) in Chinese Buddhist logic, see Chen, 1974: 110-113; Zheng, 1997: 40-45; 
2007: 199-200; and Frankenhauser, 1996: 42, 61. 
27 A reference to The Book of Odes (Shijing 詩經), ode 202 (Legge, 1967: 352). 
28 Zhenjie was one of the pioneers of the short-lived “revival” of logical and epistemo-
logical studies in China during the Ming period. However, his interpretation was not 
substantially improved upon by later authors. 
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The sheer contrast between the informal language of this passage and 
the technical vocabulary employed in Passages [3a] and [8a], written a 
thousand years earlier by the disciples of Xuanzang, speaks volumes a-
bout the decline of post-Tang Chinese Buddhist logic. Needless to say, 
this fragment offers no new insights concerning the logical aspect of the 
fallacy it attempts to explain. 
The fallacy of “inconsistency with one’s own words” as a rhetorical 
tool  
One of the first recorded cases of an East Asian author using the accusa-
tion of “inconsistency with one’s own words” in the context of an actual 
debate appears in the Critical Discussion on Inference (P’an piryang non 判比
量論) by the Korean monk Wŏnhyo (元曉, 617-686). Ironically, in this 
work Wŏnhyo employed Dignāga’s “science of reasons” partly in order to 
challenge tenets specific to Xuanzang’s school (Lusthaus, 2012: 284). The 
fallacy in question is ascribed to an unidentified opponent who holds 
that “words do not reveal the Pure Land”. Wŏnhyo asks whether this 
statement was intended to deny the possibility of obtaining any sort of 
knowledge about the Pure Land by means of language, or rather, the pos-
sibility of conveying the “essence” (ch’e 體) of the Pure Land through 
words. On the first interpretation, the opponent cannot avoid the charge 
of “inconsistency with one’s own words”, as what he says is in fact yet 
another doctrinal statement about the Pure Land. On the second inter-
pretation, his claim does not pose any challenge to the stance which, as 
may be surmised, Wŏnhyo regards as the orthodox Buddhist view (X53:
860.951a7-15; Lusthaus, 2012: 286).29 The distinction made by Wŏnhyo 
implies that his approach to self-refuting statements was more nuanced 
than that proposed by Xuanzang’s disciples in their discussions of Sen-
tence [2]. This points to the specifically Buddhist context of this issue, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
29 Since the surviving text is incomplete and not well preserved, it is difficult to 
determine the exact doctrinal affiliation and stance of Wŏnhyo’s opponent. According 
to Dan Lusthaus, Wŏnhyo aimed to refute the view that “words” (Buddhist teachings?) 
are insufficient to prove that the Pure Land (presumably, the Western Pure Land of 
Buddha Amitābha) really exists. 
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which was not directly tackled by Wengui, Shentai and Kuiji, but which 
nevertheless was perceived by most Buddhist authors as much more 
significant than its purely logical dimension.  
In all of the commentaries quoted above the self-refuting Sentence [2] 
is attributed to unspecified non-Buddhist “heretics” (tīrthika, waidao 外
道). This rhetoric somewhat obscures the fact that Indian Buddhist deba-
ters were skilled not only in refuting this kind of claim, but also in de-
fending their own claims against similar refutations. This pertains espe-
cially to the so-called Mādhyamikas, followers of the legendary sage 
Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-250?), who propounded the teaching of universal 
“emptiness” (Skt. śūnyavāda). Whereas the point of this core Buddhist 
doctrine is that nothing exists of itself and independently of something 
else, non-Buddhist opponents often misunderstood Nāgārjuna’s thesis as 
a nihilist denial of existence as such. In a polemical work called The Refu-
tation of Criticisms (Vigrahavyāvartanī, Hui zheng lun 回諍論) Nāgārjuna re-
sponds to the argument that by calling all phenomena “empty” he im-
plies that no statement, including his own, can be true (T32:1561.15b; 
Perrett, 1984: 249-254). In Bhāviveka’s Light of Wisdom (Prajñāpradīpa, Ban-
ruo deng lun 般若燈論), an anonymous opponent ridicules the Mādhya-
mikas, saying that their talk of all phenomena being empty of their own 
nature is as illogical as stating that someone is the child of a barren wo-
man and a celibate monk (T30:1566.93b). 
It appears that at least some Chinese commentators on logical trea-
tises were aware that condemnation of Sentence [2] had some risky im-
plications for the Buddhist standpoint. A response to this problem can be 
found in a commentary to the Introduction to Logic by Zhizhou (智周, 668-





Question: According to the Buddhist teachings, no verbal discourse 
can reach the essence of phenomena, and [as such] it is false. How is 
this any different from the schemes of the non-Buddhists [who say 
that all statements are false]?  
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Answer: According to the schemes of the non-Buddhists, all the words 
and sentences that are uttered are [only] false talk. They do not con-
vey [quanbiao 詮表] anything. Now, what Buddhism says is different: 
although we cannot reach the real essence [of phenomena by means 
of language], we can refer to phenomena [at the conventional level]. 
[Therefore, verbal discourse] still has [some] function […] (X53:854.
858b23-c2).  
Zhizhou concedes that the Buddhist view of language superficially re-
sembles the self-refuting views of skeptical “heretics”, as it stipulates 
that linguistic concepts cannot reflect reality as it really is. However, he 
stresses that unlike their opponents, Buddhists admit the possibility of 
meaningful communication by the means of words. This rather obscure 
fragment deals with crucial tenets of the Buddhist philosophy of lan-
guage, and for this reason demands study in its own right. In the context 
of the present discussion, the most important observation regarding its 
content is that Zhizhou differentiates his stance from the self-refuting 
position exemplified by Sentence [2] by introducing a more nuanced 
understanding of the predicate “false”. This approach is opposite to the 
one adopted by the fictional non-Buddhist opponent in Passages [3] and 
[7], where self-refutation is avoided by excluding the statement about all 
statements from the range of the universal quantifier “all”. 
Conclusions  
One of the most interesting aspects of research into Chinese comment-
aries on the Indian treatises about the “science of reasons” is the issue of 
specifically Chinese developments within the system transmitted from 
India, that is, the “sinification” of Indian Buddhist logic. Unfortunately, 
as far as the topic of the present article is concerned, any conclusion re-
garding this point can only be tentative, due to the fact that we cannot 
be certain to what extent the ideas expressed by Chinese commentators 
in the Passages [3], [7] and [8] are really their own. As previously noted, 
it is not improbable that Xuanzang’s disciples utilized some “unwritten” 
Indian sources, pieces of oral commentary which their master had 
learned in India. This hypothesis could be reliably tested only by pursu-
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ing a much more in-depth survey of Indian logical literature than has 
been attempted in the present paper. The comparison between Chinese 
approaches to the fallacy of “inconsistency with one’s own words” and 
their possible models extracted from Indian works extant in the Chinese 
Buddhist canon suggests that the interpretations of Chinese monks are 
not only original, but also in many ways superior to their antecedents in 
Indian literature. 
The Indian source of inspiration that presents itself as the most 
conspicuous in most cases is The Treatise on Accordance with Truth attri-
buted to Vasubandhu. This work presents refutations of the sentences “A 
virgin has a child” and “I reject all that is said” in a section devoted to 
“sophisms” (dūṣaṇa, wudaoli nan 無道理難). It is not concerned with the 
thorough analysis of those propositions, but merely suggests a way to 
address claims of this kind so as to make the opponent concede defeat in 
debate. On the other hand, in their comments on the sentences “My mo-
ther is that barren woman” and “All statements are false” Chinese 
monks try to elucidate the exact nature of the fallacies exemplified 
therein using the technical vocabulary of the fairly advanced theoretical 
system of Dignāga’s science of reasons. In doing this, they achieved re-
markable results.  
Wengui’s commentary offers a convincing explanation of the differ-
ence between the two exemplifications of “inconsistency with one’s own 
words”, which is apparently unparalleled in the history of East Asian 
Buddhist logic before the twentieth century. He explicates Sentence [1] 
as a thesis whose subject and predicate are contrary terms, and Sentence 
[2] as a thesis that entails contradiction between itself and its “inten-
tion”, which amounts to the assertion that “All statements are false” is a 
true statement. While these may not be Wengui’s original ideas, their 
precise formulation is probably his own achievement.  
Wengui’s co-disciple Shentai views Sentence [2] as a paradoxical 
statement that forces its proponent to admit a self-defeating or absurd 
conclusion regardless of whether it is true or false. The structure of his 
argument resembles a similar refutation in the text attributed to Vasu-
bandhu. Nevertheless, his own comments (logically erroneous as they 
are) are more profound than those of the Indian author. For one thing, 
Shentai’s commentary deals with the abstract and difficult problem of 
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predicating truth and falsity of statements about all (remaining) state-
ments, and does it to a considerable level of sophistication.  
The interpretation of Kuiji, historically the most influential, is note-
worthy for the clear spelling out of the contradiction underlying Sen-
tence [1]. Otherwise it does not add much to the opinions of the two 
aforementioned commentators, except for a rather convoluted fragment 
which attributes the self-refutation of Sentence [2] to incongruence be-
tween the thesis itself and its two constituent parts. The fact that this 
argument was attributed by Kuiji to the “bodhisattva” Dignāga, and fur-
ther enshrined by his own authority for the centuries to come, appears 
very unfortunate for the development of the East Asian tradition of 
Buddhist logic, especially given that the theoretical grasp of its prin-
ciples clearly deteriorated after the Tang period.  
The findings of the present paper confirm the view that the develop-
ment of Buddhist logic in East Asia was severely hindered by a lack of 
sustained interest in the theory of reasoning among the Chinese. Both 
secular Chinese culture and Chinese interpretations of Buddhist doctrine 
provided relatively few incentives and conceptual tools to identify and 
pursue the purely logical issues underlying the system of the “science of 
reasons”. There is no way of knowing how Wengui’s commentary would 
have looked if he had been acquainted with a living commentarial 
tradition on the ancient Mohist Canons (Mo bian 墨辯), where the self-
refutation of Sentence [2] is noted and exposed. It is futile to speculate 
on the direction in which further commentaries on passages such as 
Shentai’s Passage [7c] could have evolved if some more analytically-
minded Chinese author had wanted to bother himself with carrying the 
fictional debate further. In fact, even accomplished scholar monks from 
the school of Xuanzang, often touted as the most “intellectual” and “phi-
losophical” strand in the history of Chinese Buddhism, did not regard 
the logical aspect of the fallacy of “inconsistency with one’s own words” 
as an issue of importance. As demonstrated by the case of Zhizhou, if the 
statement “All words are false” attracted any attention outside the con-
text of word-by-word commentaries on Dignāga’s treatise, it was not be-
cause of its self-refuting character, but rather because it could serve as 
an example of heterodox views concerning the relation between lan-
guage and reality.  
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This being said, it should be noted that whenever the interpretations 
of Chinese commentators appear unsatisfactory or incorrect, they reveal 
the inherent limitations of the system they were working within, rather 
than their own misunderstandings of this system. Granted, if Chmielew-
ski’s criticism of Kuiji’s pseudo-Dignāgan argument is accepted, Kuiji’s 
argument could be regarded as a case of logical confusion due to the 
grammatical structure of the Chinese sentence (double quantification) 
and the typically Chinese tendency to structure arguments in parallel 
fashion (after all, Kuiji erroneously assumes that “inconsistency with 
one’s own words” has to be explained as “inconsistency with the dharmin” 
and “inconsistency with the dharma”).30  
However, the commentary of Wengui discussed above provides some 
examples of formulations which are linguistically or conceptually more 
precise than the Indian text that might have inspired them. For example, 
whereas in Paramārtha’s translation of The Treatise on Accordance with 
Truth a self-excepting statement is said to refer to “not all” statements, 
Wengui in a similar context uses the more explicit phrase “all other 
statements” (餘一切言). Although the Indian author mentions only an 
unspecified “mutual opposition” between the two parts of the thesis “A 
virgin has a child” (此二相違), Wengui explains this kind of fallacy in a 
more precise manner, as a semantic conflict between subject and 
predicate terms ([有]法之言).  
These observations might be taken to suggest that, far from being 
constrained or limited by their language or “patterns of thought”, the 
Chinese commentators were capable of clarifying some ambiguous theo-
retical aspects of the Indian “science of reasons” using their own words. 
However, a more definite statement regarding the independent contri-
butions of Chinese monks would have to be corroborated by a thorough 
survey of passages from South Asian works that deal with similar subject 
matter. One of the purposes of the present article is to provide reference 
-------------------------------------------------- 
30 Chmielewski himself, in his discussion of ancient Chinese logical thought, maintained 
that the rules of quantification in Classical Chinese and the frequent use of parallelism 
as a stylistic device have a potentially positive role in “spontaneous logical thinking” 
(Chmielewski, 2009: 244, 260-268).  
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points for those who are more competent to carry this discussion fur-
ther. 
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